



PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE

Journal of the APPA

Volume 18 Number 2 July 2023

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Hume's Psychology and Artificial Virtues as Applied to Philosophical Practice

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Abstract

In organizational consulting, the individual is part of the collective whole which fits David Hume's description of a naturally self-interested person in an artificial world. The description of the emotional reaction a person has to experience ties directly to the artificial virtues of property as resources and the rules, or formal procedures and policies governing resources in an organization. Further, language regarding 'allegiance' and political change are meaningful in organizational change. The philosophical move towards considering the disinterested spectator allows for individuals to review policies, procedures, and processes in organizational change initiatives.

Keywords: *David Hume, moral psychology, artificial virtues, organizational consulting*

Introduction

The aim of this piece is to employ David Hume's descriptive methodology in consultative practice. There is a thread of thought regarding natural passions and sentiment, beginning in the *Treatise* running through his vast compilation of essays and ending in his *Enquiries*, that creates a unified thought through his textual changes. While the movement of that thought regarding natural passions and sentiment to restrained taste and calm passions is interesting in and of itself, the focus again here is to employ that very movement of thought to consulting.

Self-Interest and Resources

Philosophers such as Hume regarded their work as a matter of description, not prescription. Hume never intended his philosophy to serve as the basis of anyone's particular behavior. Rather, Hume's endeavor was simply to explain human nature and human behavior. That is, Hume was only explaining behavior, not encouraging a particular set of actions.

Hume notes that all humans only work with and reference the perceptions in their minds. These perceptions can be either *forceful and lively* impressions or more faint ideas. Technically, simple impressions are just our sense data, simple ideas are merely memories generated from this sense data, and complex ideas are the work of our imagination on these memories. The complex impression, though, sense data with the emotional component, highlights the self-interested nature of our processing. In addition, this is precisely the beginning of the application of Hume's work to practical philosophy.

There is something gained, protected, and wagered in every decision. Many of our dilemmas pit ourselves against others or, maybe even ourselves. That is, nearly every decision comes by way of self-interest first, which can house a number of biases in our thinking. True, Hume does believe people can and do feel for others as, but that could be merely a version of self-interest. In short, perceptions of sense data with a component of emotional reaction sets the stage not only for the

development of his moral philosophy, but also for any consultative process. Further, coupling this belief that there is a great uniformity among the actions of men from the second *Enquiry*, which he sees in his views on passions, fits many current models of psychology (Selby-Bigge, 1975). For example, reactionary passions that are similar across time and space may resonate with psychological need theory of the direct passion; some are violent with respect to intensity and reaction and fear are prime examples. Taken with Maslow's hierarchy of needs as an example, fear most closely fits a level of when basic survival needs are not met. Hume, of course, does not say anything like this overtly, but consider how the *Treatise* is structured and his discussion of artificial virtues quickly follow this discussion in Book Three. Here, it is clearly delineated that there is an order to the development of the artificial virtues, property first then justice and finally allegiance (Selby-Bigge, 1975). Additionally, the first foundation for these artificial virtues is self-interest, the fear of loss of individual resources. This is a critical element to bear in mind to begin with and philosophical consultative practice. Before moving forward to the next artificial virtue of justice, it will be beneficial to consider how these concerns play out individually.

There are three elements of human psychology at work here. One is the moral psychology of individual human behavior. This moral psychology can extend into group psychology, and for whom it really is a matter of sort of political organization, but the same elements are at work in companies and organizations. While there may not be kings or Parliament's, there are CEOs and presidents and executive boards and boards of trustees and they may operate in similar fashion. Lastly, there is a sort of epistemic psychology that might be useful for change initiatives. There may be challenges between the is-ought fallacy and whether there is any sort of norm to adhere to in process improvement and change initiatives, but they do not have to be fatal to change processes.

Therefore, considering self-awareness, passions, reaction, and response, here they are really about managing needs and motivations. There is a connection already between complex impressions of reflection, self-interest, and property resources. Resources, though, refers to time, money and energy, not exclusively property, in the consultative process. In the short term, there is only access to individual perceptions and there are two varieties, impressions and ideas. Both can be broken down again into subcategories. The simple impressions are the impressions of sensation or sense data. The impressions of reflection are more important because that is where the impressions of emotions and passions are generated.

Moral Sentiments

Traditional explanations of Hume's complex impressions run along the lines of sense data laced with an emotional component or reaction. After some investigation of this emotional response, these are determined to be, in the *Treatise*, either calm or violent passions. The calm passions are often mistaken for some subversive view of reason, although that is completely wrong. The calm passions are still sentiments albeit "weak" ones. They may function more like matters of taste as when one finds a painting pleasing but is motivated to buy or steal it. Violent passions, on the other hand, do have more motivation behind them. In addition, the source of both of these passions is self-interest. Hume correctly notes that most of our thinking is clouded with self-interested thinking.

At the heart of this biased thinking lay the violent passions, which are either direct or indirect passions. Direct violent passions are fear, hope, desire, joy, *et cetera* as they center on the directness of

pleasure and pain. A personal reaction to something is going to be a direct reaction of fear, hope, joy, pleasure, pain, etc. Considering reactions like love and hate and pride and humility, those are intense as well as you can really hate somebody and you can really love somebody. But, these are differentiated as in the case of pride and humility, which can be more indirect and have a lower reactionary drive because they have objects as the focal point. For example, one can be proud of herself or some attribute of herself and she can also be proud of the work she created. Finally, with respect to the calm passions, which many mistake this for reason, is a more restrained or tamed sentiment, later called taste that can be similar to having a sense of seeing beauty in uniformity and symmetry. Here, again, individuals have an emotional response, in this case, a sense of uniformity to an external object. This perhaps is the seat of or drive of sense of individual preferences and wants as calm passions are motivating without the forcefulness of violent ones.

Hume and Psychology

John Immerwahr states that Hume's ideal is that the violent passions are undesirable as those are reactions whereas the calm passions are preferable as they are responses that create a greater "strength of will" in various situations and they can actually counter or weaken violent reactions. According to Immerwahr, this, for Hume, is a matter of maintaining happiness (Immerwahr, 1989). An individual's happiness often depends on the situation and, for present purposes, on resources. In fact, Hume's theory may fit a particular kind of need theory. In psychology, the endogenous theory of preferences is applied to businesses as humans effectively respond to external states of affairs and situations.

In the field of neuroscience, Richard C. Sha notes that Hume has undergone a resurgence for his claim that "reason is and ought only be a slave of the passions" (Neuroscience Has Much to Learn from Hume's Philosophy of Emotions | Psyche Ideas, n.d.). It is a famous quote from the *Treatise* and there is a realization that there is a lot of emotional regulation at play in the workplace. For Hume, these emotions come down to four basic moral sentiments of pride, humility, love and hate, potentially. It is important for Hume to talk about general agreement of sentiments to explain why there are agreements on rules about resources and the like, but to say there is just one size that fits all may be a mistake. The idea that people are really at the mercy of our sentiments, passions, emotions, most of the time may make it impossible to achieve agreements even in process improvement efforts. Therefore, in consulting and considering how people work together, before achieving teamwork, people work as themselves for themselves. All varieties of need theory, all the language of love, hate, pride, humility falls into this level of self-interest. According to Hume, when people come together, they will organize. Moreover, though it may be odd to discuss property as related to justice and allegiance here, the property conversation is needed to elucidate the connection between self-interest, sentiment or passions, and resources.

Managing Resources

People argue about resources; how much money they have, how much time they have, how much energy they have. In addition, those things trigger moral sentiments of love, hate, pride, humility, joy, fear, hope, desire, etc. Therefore, during the consultative process, one needs to be cognizant that if it is resources that are the primary concern, then those resources need to be reviewed to see how those are managed for people. A process improvement training is embedded into the consul-

tative process to generate real life examples. In process improvement, the first thing to consider is the voice of the customer. Take the first thing that customers want and work a process backwards to create what's called a pull schedule instead of a push schedule. Essentially, take the customer's timeline and work backwards until the schedule is filled forward for them. Potentially, employees may actually gain breathing room in terms of time and energy.

Specifically, many schedules are built to the demand of the bottom line. In some sense, this is ideal for the customer, if it saves her money. But, again, there are other metrics and considerations such as time. When the product is available can be as important as cost. The convenience of procuring the product is another consideration. Taking these into account in scheduling could indeed change the structure of processes and schedules.

Participants in a workshop are asked to engage in an activity to highlight how current models may create problems rather than solve them. The first time through, the exercise is a disaster, though, because people just work according to standard time lines set by 'management,' ostensibly for resource purposes. This exercise highlights how current efficiency-only processes often create bottlenecks, for example, putting employees into stress and then they react out of those violent passions towards management.

Case Study Part 1

During the process improvement facilitation embedded in the consultative process, there are four key points during the training. This case study centers on a facilitation from the fall of 2021 with a local non-profit. The first process improvement exercise was run and, in the follow up, a simple question was asked, "what is a process that you want to improve?" This is a conversation starter and it may not be addressed at any other point in the session. It is interesting, though, that there was a "uniformity" of "oh, this is a problem." "We know payroll is a problem." "This is a thing we want to fix or to adjust or update." Ultimately, this question is posed, "how do you feel about that?" Essentially, what is the impression of reflection? What is the self-interest sentiment that goes with it? Is it violent? Is it directed? Calm? This is a perfect example because payroll touches the most basic violent passion of fear and it relates directly to an individual's personal resources of money. Because of this, it does become imperative to address this concern for all the parties concerned, both staff and management.

Social Awareness of the Rules

Social awareness, in this paper, genuinely means understanding the rules that govern resources of time, money, and energy. In Hume's language, this is exactly what justice is, the rules that oversee the distribution of resources. Well noted in the *Treatise*, there are two foundations for justice. One is self-interest, again, concern about individual resources; individual property such as time, salary, wage, etc. Then, Hume says the second foundation is moral approval, found in the language of sympathy (Selby-Bigge, 1978). Technically, he is wrong, but, just linguistically he is wrong. In the *Treatise*, he says that sympathy is the mechanism by which another's pleasure or pain is communicated to myself. Essentially, the realization that the rules might work for more of us than just one individual is how that feeling is communicated.

In the *Enquiry*, he changes this language to utility in order to make it less confusing. Yet, there remain other confusing questions of, "what is best for everyone's approval?" This is not the same forward thinking utility as actually voting for something, so to speak. It is pre-Bentham and pre-Mill, but it is very much something that determines what benefits all of us. How does this really work? Clearly, it is not going to be the faculty of reason. Reason may surface mental models and data for the sentiments to judge but utility and reason are not motivating as they are impotent. Ultimately, this is a description for human action and behavior such that determining what is best for everyone is probably going to go through some conflict. Hume does speculate, or at least there is such a focus in his language, that there is a propensity towards calm passions and a sense of uniformity and preferences that may be an underlying corrective to conflict. In his philosophical essays, he often lauds the principled factions of change over the speculative factions that often sound like they are led by violent passions and sentiment rather than calm passions and taste (Haakonssen, 1993).

Hume's Foundations

A challenge many have towards Hume's descriptive theory is that his view seems to be relativistic, if not individualistic. Even in the context of calm passions, those are individual responses to situations. Sympathy and utility may help clarify a sense of connection to others or decisions with respect to others, but it is not clear where it comes from. In other parts of the *Treatise*, Hume mentions the general point of view or general standards, where people tend to agree this way and in other places, he refers to the psychology of custom and habit. Custom and habit language works for discussing human behavior and possibly about decision making as it is the thing that undergirds almost all decisions. In essence, our minds are pattern recognition machines and, because of this, most behaviors line up as a result of most everyone seeing the same patterns, in general.

In both his epistemology and descriptive morality, custom and habit are the psychological underpinning for agreeing to general rules of behavior and the general rules of causation even. Interestingly, whereas animals have instinct for their survival, humans have causation as a thought process. But, this is not an instinct, per se. In fact, as a matter of Hume's epistemological psychology, humans cannot help but to think in terms of cause and effect. It is certainly a useful survival tool and, in so far as pattern recognition is useful, nearly everyone agrees out of custom and habit. That is not to say, however, that the answer is always correct. One can imagine that a motionless flat earth model made the most sense. And, one does not have to imagine how difficult it was to correct that model. In fact, the motionless flat earth was certainly more common sensical and agreeable. Such a seismic change did not come easily and is a good representative of how difficult change can be inside organizations.

There is an interesting parallel between organizational structures and behaviors as well as thinking being based on custom and habit. The idea of utility, to the extent that it works, works. However, it may also make changes difficult as there still can be differences as to what is perceived as useful pattern. In the case of lean enterprises, most can agree on making some changes but there is a great deal of hesitation if the changes comes at the expense of employees and eliminating staff.

Individuals to Organizations

Employment and organizational structures are truly supposed to be voluntary structures with exchange of money for time and services. Moreover, there are political arguments regarding resources

such as budgets between departments and divisions. The budget is a great source of conflicts and people look to the rules to solve those issues. This is no different from the artificial virtues used for politics. The only difference here is that perhaps it is better than just acknowledging tacit consent. Due to right to work laws in certain states, individuals can resign or they can be dismissed. This is akin to exile, political exile, if you want to put it that way. Nevertheless, some steps can be taken before complete separation or dismantling of teams. There are artificial virtues that could work here; obligation, exchange, fidelity, promise keeping, truth-telling, etc. Virtues come in varieties for Hume. There are some that are agreeable to us individually and those agreeable to the group. There are also those that are useful to individuals and those useful to the greater group. In that regard, systems within organizations that foster truth-telling, promise keeping obligations and the like, benefit all of everyone and may avoid pernicious splits as a matter of utility.

Still, everything above only reifies existing structures. None of them necessarily lend themselves to change or initiatives that allow for change. Problematically, there are no additional tools available for creating change. In Hume's descriptive analysis there are no divine laws or commands or alternatives to naturalism to find answers to difficult dilemmas. Somehow the 'answers' must already be present within the process.

Creating Ideal Processes

After conducting another round of manufacturing improvement exercises, even if the team has improved things from the last simulation, the team goes into a deep dive about eliminating wastes. Depending on the model used, there are at least seven forms of waste. In general, though, there is always a waste of paper and time and motion and energy. This implies a waste of resources, not just a waste of money only. And, often this waste is dictated by policy. It is often an old and unquestioned policy but, again, it is more efficient supposedly to continue as-is rather than stopping to address conflicts and issues in the system.

This discussion turns out to be a practical lesson on change coming from within existing systems and models. Indeed, change needs to take place but there is rarely reference to an external source for change. There can be, at times, external solutions such as new technology but more often than not, the change comes in the form of altering present conditions.

Case Study Part 2

Going back to that parking lot question in the payroll example, a question is directed, "Can you tell me about the problem. Do you really understand what needs to change?" It is a fascinating bit of exploration because one of the things that surfaces is why there is conflict. No one has the same perception of the thing that needs to change. They may all agree on what needs to change, but they have a different perception of it. In this example, some think the payroll specialist is not doing their job. Some think that person is just doing it wrong. Some think new technology and software will fix everything. Same problem and half a dozen perspectives and solutions exist. Additionally, with no agreement there can be no change.

Situational Management

To get beyond the language of *allegiance*, there should be a code switch to language about regulations and policy because once the rules of justice of the organization are in place, there must be a

policy, procedure, and process to reify them. This is typically short-handed as the organization or the institution. This will be the continued language in place of allegiance.

Of course, oftentimes the organization appears to be a monumental behemoth of bureaucracy that deflects change in near autonomous fashion. That mindset successfully freezes and eliminates change in most cases. In the instances where everyone has said there needs to be change, then there has to be even small change or there is no change at all. In the consultative process, this is referred to as the 3 degree change. A colleague of the author has used this term often because, even if it means making a shift of only three minutes or three degrees or three feet, at least it's better than nothing. However, it is always hard to discern what the thing that needs to change is. How do you actually accomplish this change?

A potential method is to walk the process. In many cases, differing perspectives can be brought together by investigating one process from the beginning to the end. As a group walks a process, everyone sees the same bottle necks, redundancy, waste, and stress on staff. While individually each saw their own issue in the process, bottle neck versus stress, for example, looking at the situation together can highlight multiple issues and possibly multiple solutions.

Sustainability

While Hume is not generally interested in developing moral oughts, he is quite adept at explaining moral judgment and choice. Moreover, he thinks he can explain when and how individuals change their mind or adjust their original judgments. Working from the *Treatise*, the answer developed is in the work of sympathy and the calm passions. Of course, all of this is removed in the *Enquiry*, but that could be a mistake in the larger context of explaining behavior. Hume drops this initial language because of the reception and repercussions of having made such bold claims such as 'reason is and ought only be a slave to the passions.' That was not received well by much of the eighteenth century. So, he assuaged attitudes and fears by switching to the use of the term of utility to cover the work of reason and its relationship to the judgment of approval or disapproval by sentiment.

It was an intelligent move but failed to account for the individual work of the disinterested spectator. Discussed in the *Enquiry* is the work of a magistrate, after discussing the artificial virtue of allegiance, whose sole motive is to see the rules of justice followed. He or she has no particular interest in who may win in a property dispute, but the magistrate is definitely motivated to see the rules adhered to and followed. By sentiment, this makes sense and explains the 'third party' nature of the adjudicator. But, it fails to be translated to individual decision-making and judgment.

The difficulty in reading and applying anything in Hume's philosophy is his own adherence to descriptive philosophy. For anything near a prescriptive approach, readers must delve into his essays. That is, there is a prescriptive view of social or political change in the essays that are grounded in social progress. Additionally, this resonates with the correction of sentiment by a fixed or steady general point of view. In fact, this may serve as a prescriptive basis for the disinterested spectator. For the consultative process, the analogous point is that there may be cultural corporate drivers for change. But, this does require either an analogous disinterested spectator or something better.

Defects

In the next round of simulations, even if the modified process to eliminate the waste worked, the new challenge to think differently is to explore where problems could arise. People often look at processes as “okay, how can we improve them?” as if they function well currently. The challenge at this point is to say, “No, make it worse.” “Take what you currently do now and make it 100 times worse for the customer or the client, whomever you are serving.” When people look to make things better, the brain already works in a way to find that uniformity that satisfies the calm passion or taste. The desire is to find that the structures all make sense. As a result, people avoid genuinely finding and solving problems. However, if people actually go make problems, then they actually do see problems.

Case in point, in training a local credit union going through some significant building and operational changes, this exercise showed them they were missing some significant pieces in their existing process improvement models. A new building was underway and current and new departments were working on a new joint venture within the organization. By most accounts, progress was positive even though some issues had been identified. In that framework, those identified issues had working solutions. Yet, after the exercise, more concerns surfaced for which there were no working solutions. Nevertheless, there are multiple ways to surface problems and conflict.

Case Study Part 3

In the example of the nonprofit payroll issue, the group is asked, “Why haven’t you made that change to payroll?” If everyone knew the answer because everyone saw the same problem, then why has not everyone had the same answer?” Fire the payroll specialist, for example. If they knew the answer, why did they not act on it? There was something else holding them back. Here is where my critique of Hume surfaces. If everything is set by custom and habit, how are changes made within the framework of custom and habit? Even when Hume pushes for approaches such as being disinterested or referring back to the general common point of view, it is still often in support of the existing set of rules as they benefit everyone. In essence, his concern is that only the rules are being supported. There may not be anyone trying to make the system better for themselves and thereby not necessarily trying to make it better for anybody else. It is a vague attempt to make the system better for everyone by supporting the current rules, which is often only the bottom line. And, most people have coached themselves to that level, to almost organizational detriment. As a result, the next challenge comes as matters of hard cases and situations of rule skepticism.

Action Planning

A hard case is, by definition, one where a right answer is not derivable from rules, but a right answer does exist and is the answer to its specific hard case. In rule skepticism, there is no certainty that the existing policies, procedures, *et cetera* will be of any decision-making assistance. Both of these concerns can be barriers to change. In the absence of a quick path to change, many will remain in a state of suspension and maintain the status quo. Interestingly, the paralysis may exist in terms of thinking only.

In essence, the consultative process regarding improvement has been an effort to get teams to get to a level of skepticism to not say there is no answer but to never just sit back and say, “Oh, I know

the answer." Quick answers are often wrong, especially those calling the other side 'wrong.' A good skeptic will find an answer and then put it into action to test. There will not exist any certainty prior to that test. Problematically, even using taste and calm passions does not negate the issues of the general point of view because it is about pleasure and of course, that goes to utility. Ultimately, then, the question of whose pleasure or whose utility will arise. For Hume, the judicious spectator is there to support their official virtues that already exist. In addition, any individuals "not partial to anyone" may be really trying to be partial to the existing rules only. With concerns of skepticism and rules and hard cases, individuals have to be open that maybe something else could be wrong, such as the rules themselves. As a result, the general point of view may not always be the answer and the efficiency model or bottom line only may not always be the answer.

In the Third Appendix to the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, "Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice," David Hume states, "the preference given by the judge is often founded more on taste and imagination than on any solid argument" (Selby-Bigge, 1975). In this section, Hume is discussing the machinations of law and politics but this troubling statement may be the basis of real organizational change as well. Consider that nearly any decision is founded more upon taste and imagination than argument. This appears to be the root and result of Hume's own descriptive skepticism. Perhaps, then, his "Essays on Happiness" are less about happiness and Hellenistic philosophy and more about what these Hellenistic schools represent in how one thinks with respect to 'taste and imagination' and change. This is to say, a reading of his four essays as a commentary on various biases may be enlightening for both the *Treatise* and the *Enquiry* and change initiatives. The consistent line of thought, missing from Hume's lexicon, may be his exploration of biases as rooted in sentiment, personality, and one's own perception of happiness.

Applying Hume's points to the consultative process, the right answer, in some cases, may be summed up as 'put people over the processes' in decision making. In law and reform, that social context drove presumably prescriptive dictates. In the consultative process, similar concerns should establish that the organization works better and is healthier when the people are deemed more important the processes.

Hume and Contextualism

The disinterested spectator called upon to adjudicate in disputes over the rules of justice must fulfill two requirements. First, she must be uninterested in who benefits from the decision. Secondly, she must be solely interested in the adherence to the rules of justice such that she is not completely uninterested in the outcome of the case. With this role model, individuals see that a decision maker must ascertain all of the facts first but sentiment will still make the final decision. The only 'rule' to follow is to decide based on utility, not speculations.

What has been set up is a battle of desires against reason or rationality simply does not exist. If self-interest is eliminated, reason does not remain behind. Even if it did, reason does not motivate human behavior. Rather, self-interest and sentiment motivate behavior. These elements must be resolved, perhaps, through what Hume calls "strength of mind" and the calm passions.

There is a quote attributed to Hume, 'truth springs from disagreement amongst friends.' Truth, as a useful artificial virtue as well as promise keeping, *et cetera* are non-rule oriented virtues of resolving

the conflict of self-interest and sentiment. They may not be natural virtues necessarily but, like the natural virtues, they also have sentiment at their base and, more importantly, they motivate human action without reference to rules.

Communication and Accountability

As only the passions can motivate one to decide and act, the object of the passion can make it reasonable or unreasonable but reason is not motivating any part of the decision making process. When people are 'calm,' however, Hume says it can give the appearance of someone who is reasonable and unaffected by emotions. Descriptively, Hume is correct in saying that it is appearance only and that reason does not indeed make the final decisions and cause people to act. At some level, decision making always pertains to an emotional response of some kind.

'Strength of mind,' as Hume calls it, is what overpowers or overrides the violent passions. The question is, then, how can this be accomplished? Not unexpectedly, Hume states that distance in time and space help to cool the violent passions. According to Baier, this evaluation by sentiment is not just emotivism but a reflective judgment on one's passions (Baier, 2009). Hume further notes things like 'general rules can influence judgment' and 'the imagination adheres to the general views of things' but there is not offered a definition of what these general rules and general views are. While Hume's descriptive philosophy is insightful, its lack of normative assistance can render it virtually useless.

Throughout the *Treatise*, Hume uses terminology such as the calm and violent passions and sympathy yet he abandons those terms in the *Enquiry* and, for present purposes, it may lend some assistance in decision-making. Hume is clear in the *Enquiry* that reason and sentiment are at work in moral determinations. The existing possibility for the resolution of conflicting sentiments in 'strength of will' may be more like a general point of view based on shared experience rather than mere rule support or as Baier notes, interpersonal agreement (Baier, 2009). Arguments over rules tend to be conflicts of self-interest. When individuals share experiences, it is easier for sentiments and taste to align. This may even have something to do with Hume's own view on commerce and how the arts are refined through trade with other countries. That is, more shared experiences and more understanding and a general, public good will is generated as delineated in the second *Enquiry*.

Case Study Part 4

Returning to the payroll example, at the end of the consultative process or the facilitation for the day, the process they wanted to evaluate or change is reviewed again. Understanding the difference between their individual needs, how time, money, resources, and energy are allocated in the future and the group dynamic of organizational rules relative to having a structure alongside personal needs and habits and behaviors forces groups to think through the things that can be done. People must think individually about their personal role in the process and what they can do to create a small sustainable change. There must be an action plan.

Annette Baier has, in her book, *Progress of Sentiments*, a note regarding Hume that people cannot change their nature. "We cannot change who we are." However, people can change their situation. This language is powerful insofar as many think character must be improved in many cases. There certainly can always be improvements but it must be centered on the situation or process.

This approach requires something that is not just a self-interested natural motive but a sort of corrected initial sympathy bias. In the current example, sympathy with this payroll specialist and this position or where it falls in process shows that termination or replacement is not the only answer. In fact, the solution turned out to be to change the timelines for the payroll process. Upon evaluation, a new person would not have had any more success in the current system. The current system only allowed for a part time position with offset hours to everyone else. No one could have been successful in that role regardless of software or technology.

Conclusion

In organizational consulting, the individual is part of the collective whole, which fits Hume's description of a naturally self-interested person situated in an artificial world that is government, politics, society, etc. The description of the emotional reaction a person has to experience ties directly to their artificial virtues of property as resources, and the rules or formal procedures and policies governing resources and organizations. Further, language regarding what one might call a "allegiance and political change" or meaningful organizational change and the philosophical move towards considering the disinterested spectator allows for individuals to review policies, procedures and processes in organizational change initiatives. Rather than just supporting policies and procedures and processes, genuine sympathy or sincerity or shared experience with others and supporting people over processes drives actual change.

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PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE

Journal of the APPA

Volume 18 Number 2 July 2023

Aims and Scope

Philosophical Practice is a scholarly, peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the growing field of applied philosophy. The journal covers substantive issues in the areas of client counseling, group facilitation, and organizational consulting. It provides a forum for discussing professional, ethical, legal, sociological, and political aspects of philosophical practice, as well as juxtapositions of philosophical practice with other professions. Articles may address theories or methodologies of philosophical practice; present or critique case-studies; assess developmental frameworks or research programs; and offer commentary on previous publications. The journal also has an active book review and correspondence section.

APPA Mission

The American Philosophical Practitioners Association is a non-profit educational corporation that encourages philosophical awareness and advocates leading the examined life. Philosophy can be practiced through client counseling, group facilitation, organizational consulting or educational programs. APPA members apply philosophical systems, insights and methods to the management of human problems and the amelioration of human estates. The APPA is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization.

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The American Philosophical Practitioners Association is a not-for-profit educational corporation. It admits Certified, Affiliate and Adjunct Members solely on the basis of their respective qualifications. It admits Auxiliary Members solely on the basis of their interest in and support of philosophical practice. The APPA does not discriminate with respect to members or clients on the basis of nationality, race, ethnicity, sex, gender, age, religious belief, political persuasion, or other professionally or philosophically irrelevant criteria.

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ISSN 1742-8181

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