

An Adventure with “Philosophical Health”

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Abstract

The paper examines the idea of “philosophical health” from several perspectives: conceptual, historical, and practical. One’s philosophy is not parallel to one’s body and one’s mind, it is therefore a conceptual confusion to think of philosophical counseling as parallel to medicine and psychotherapy but on the “philosophical level”. Moreover, any attempt to define “philosophical health” as a combination of a certain worldview, a certain moral approach and a certain attitude to the hazards of life, not to mention God and politics, is subjective and arbitrary, and it is dangerous to “diagnose” people with other opinions as “philosophically unhealthy”. Past philosophers who used medical metaphors either spoke of philosophy as healing or attacked opinions and attitudes that they didn’t like as “sick”. Other past philosophers offered proto-psychological explanations for what is considered nowadays mental or personality disorders, they did not deal with “philosophical disorders”. The paper also examines the attempt to “diagnose” difficulties in philosophical counseling, such as a “quasi-solipsistic attitude” or “reluctance to doubt authorities” as “philosophically unhealthy” and demonstrates its futility as well as undesired practical implications. It suggests instead to develop a needed philosophical discourse about issues of health, both on the personal level and on that of public affairs.

Keywords: *Philosophical health, philosophical discourse about health, difficulties in philosophical counseling, medical metaphors in philosophical discourse, Hegel, Sartre, Foucault, Popper, epistemic rationality, jurisprudential rationality*

An Argument for Philosophical Therapy

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Abstract

I argue for expanding the philosophical counseling scope of practice to include what I describe as “philosophical therapy”, which may be initially construed to blend already-overlapping elements of philosophical counseling and psychotherapy, and which expanded practice may or may not require expanded training, depending on the qualifications and competencies of the individual philosophical counselor. Thus, to the extent that a given philosophical counselor is trained in a variety of modalities that are themselves philosophical in origin and employed in psychotherapy, such as mindfulness, cognitive behavioral therapy, existentialism, logotherapy, Stoicism, etc., and to the extent that a large number of patients in psychotherapy seek assistance from their counselors for a number of issues that philosophical counselors address on their own terms, I think it is reasonable for our discipline to expand the scope of practice accordingly. I will develop and explore the pros and cons of this idea.

Keywords: *philosophical counseling training, philosophical counseling scope of practice, philosophical critique of psychotherapy, philosophical therapy, philosophical counseling, sanity, therapy for the sane*

Asking “How Might One Live, Here, Today?” in Philosophical Counselling: Introducing African Philosophical Perspectives

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Abstract

“How might one live?” is one of the most important questions for philosophical counselling. The reason being that in this collaborative undertaking with the counselee, the philosophical counsellor will consider, experiment with, and create alternative ways of being becoming and thinking/living. However, this explicit Deleuzian question—“How might one live?”—even if crucial as I maintain, lacks important contextualising factors and situating questions. That is, explicit situating and contextual factors are not immediately interrogated, incorporated, and taken seriously. Contemporary African philosophers explicitly think from and through these situating questions—*From where does one write?; In what language does one think/speak?*. Turning to these African philosophers, I want to positively expand the Deleuzian question by adding two crucial situating elements, viz., *here, today*. The expanded question thus reads “How might one live, here, today?”. Asking the question in this manner and speaking/writing from a (South) African perspective necessitates serious consideration of these perspectives from African philosophy.

Keywords: *philosophical counselling; African philosophy; Gilles Deleuze; “How might one live”; praxis; philosophy as a way of life*

Platonomy: The Art and Science of Self-Governance on the Road to Eudaimonia

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Abstract

This article presents “Platonomy,” a systematic framework derived from Plato’s *Politeia* that re-frames the dialogue as primarily concerned with psychological self-governance rather than political theory. The study introduces a tetradic model of the psyche extending beyond the traditional tripartite division to include constitutional governance (*auto politeia*) that determines how psychological faculties relate to one another.

The work develops practical applications through the COLA epistemological framework and SELF psychological model, along with techniques including psychagogy (soul-guidance) and counter-charms for constitutional protection. The conclusion demonstrates that genuine well-being emerges from developing internal constitutional order that enables flourishing regardless of external circumstances, offering a practical ancient path to psychological integration and sustained happiness.

Keywords: *Platonomy, constitutional psychology, auto politeia, tetradic model, self-governance, eudaimonia, psychagogy, platonic psychology, self-friendship, psychological integration, well-being, ancient philosophy*

Lead a Happy Life According to Aristotelian Thought

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Abstract

Generally, motion refers to the change of an object (with an unchanging underlying substance) from one state to another. In essence, it is the actualization of potential. Since all things inherently possess privation, their forms undergo perpetual transformation. Practice aims at and is directed towards goodness; happiness is a natural goal or aim of life and also the highest goodness. Compared with ordinary matter, humans are not only just a kind of material being, but also importantly active agents. Guided by rationality, under theoretical and practical wisdom, the form of something about us (human beings) will become more and more salutary if motion is ongoing. Thus, happiness will be achieved. This paper presents a revised model for realizing Aristotelian goodness, defines the concept of ‘goodness realization,’ and briefly discusses a case study.

Keywords: *Aristotle, happy life, happiness, rationality, the good*